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RECENT DEVELOPMENT

BROOKS v. HOUSING AUTHORITY OF BALTIMORE CITY:
THE HOUSING AUTHORITIES STATUTE EFFECTUATES A
COMPLETE WAIVER OF GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY
FOR THE TORTIOUS ACTIONS OF HOUSING
AUTHORITIES IN THEIR MAINTENANCE AND
OPERATION.
By: Heather Pensyl

T

he Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the General Assembly,
through Article 44A of the Maryland Code, completely waived
the common law right to sovereign immunity, which would have
otherwise applied to the governmental functions of housing authorities
for claims resulting from tortious conduct in their maintenance and
operation of subsidized housing. Brooks v. Hous. Auth. of Bait. City,
411 Md. 603, 984 A.2d 836 (2009) (Article 44A is now re-codified in
§§ 12-101 to 12-175 of the Housing and Community Development
article). Specifically, the court in Brooks overruled its previous
decision in Jackson v. Hous. Opportunities Comm 'n of Montgomery
County to the extent that the language of Jackson contradicted Brooks '
holding that Article 44A implemented a complete waiver of
governmental immunity. Id. at 626, 984 A.2d at 849 (citing Jackson,
289 Md. 118,422 A.2d 376 (1980)).
In 1993, the Housing Authority of Baltimore City ("HABC")
purchased a commercial insurance policy from the Housing Authority
Risk Retention Group ("HARRG"). Under the terms of the insurance
policy, the HABC was insured for, among other things, liability
against actions resulting from the ingestion or exposure to lead paint.
In May 1997, prior to the insurance policy's expiration, a
representative of the HABC presented the HARRG with a list of the
names of seventy-three children with elevated levels of lead in their
blood. The list included Devonte A. Brooks ("Brooks"), who grew up
in Baltimore City. As of September 19, 2003, HABC had exhausted
the amount of coverage for lead-based claims under its policy.
On March 15,2004, Brooks filed suit against the HABC to recover
damages for the HABC's alleged negligence and violation of the
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Maryland Consumer Protection Act ("CPA"). The HABC responded
by filing a motion for summary judgment based on the language in
Jackson, which indicated that governmental immunity, under Article
44A, only occurred to the extent covered by the insurance policy. The
Circuit Court for Baltimore City granted the motion. Brooks then
appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, which affirmed
the judgment. Brooks next filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the
Court of Appeals of Maryland, which the court granted.
Brooks made three arguments challenging the trial court's decision
to grant the motion for summary judgment. Brooks, 411 Md. at 61516, 984 A.2d at 843. First, Brooks argued that the circuit court erred
by determining that the General Assembly intended a partial, and not a
complete, waiver of governmental immunity through the enactment of
Article 44A. Id. at 615, 984 A.2d at 843. Alternatively, Brooks
contended that a dispute of material fact existed as to whether the
HABC "manufactured" its immunity through underinsuring. Id.
Finally, Brooks argued that the HABC should not receive
governmental immunity because it acted in a proprietary rather than a
governmental function. Id. at 615-16, 984 A.2d at 843. The HABC
responded to Brooks' arguments with the contention that, according to
Jackson, governmental immunity is only waived up to the limits of the
insurance coverage. Id. at 616, 984 A.2d at 843 (citing Jackson, 289
Md. 118,422 A.2d 376 (1980)). In addition, the HABC argued that,
because Brooks did not dispute that the coverage was exhausted, no
dispute of material fact existed. Id.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland couched its analysis of the two
claims, the common law negligence claim and the CPA claim, under
one overarching issue: whether the circuit court erred by granting the
HABC's motion for summary judgment on the basis that the HABC
had immunity from Brooks' claims because, during the relevant time
period, the HABC had insurance, although the limits of that insurance
were exhausted. Brooks, 411 Md. at 614, 984 A.2d at 842. Thus, the
central focus of the court's analysis revolved around whether the
HABC enjoyed governmental immunity from claims resulting from
the HABC's actions. Id. at 615, 984 A.2d at 843. More specifically,
the court analyzed whether the General Assembly, through Article
44A, waived any immunity the HABC otherwise may have had. /d.
In addressing whether the legislature intended a waiver of
immunity, the court reviewed Article 44A, which created the city's
ability to have a housing authority that would be "a public body
corporate and politic." Id. at 618, 984 A.2d at 845 (citing MD CODE
art. 44A §§ 3, 4, 22 (1937)). The court applied the two-pronged test
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first established in Katz v. Wash. Suburban Sanitary Comm'n for
determining whether sovereign or governmental immunity had been
waived: (1) the Legislature must have authorized suits for damages;
and (2) a provision for the payment of judgments must exist. [d. at
614-15, 984 A.2d at 842-43 (citing Katz, 284 Md. 503, 507-08, 397
A.2d 1027, 1030 (1979)). The court noted that section 1-301(1) of
Article 44A grants housing authorities the powers to sue and be sued,
satisfying the first prong of the Katz test. Id. at 619, 622, 984 A.2d at
845, 847 (citing MD CODE art. 44A § 1-301 (1957,2003 Rep1. Vo1.)).
The court then stated that Article 44A meets the second prong of the
Katz test because the article expressly authorized the satisfaction of
judgments through either the purchase of insurance or through the
housing authorities' own raising of funds. Brooks, 411 Md. at 623,
984 A.2d at 847-48 (citing MD CODE art. 44A §§ 1-301, 1-401 (1957,
2003 Rep1. Vol.)).
Having established that Article 44A effectuates a waiver of
governmental immunity, the court then decided whether the General
Assembly intended the waiver to be complete, rather than limited. Id.
at 622, 984 A.2d at 847. In determining this, the court reviewed its
previous decision in Jackson. Id. at 618-19, 984 A.2d at 845. The
Jackson case involved the issue of whether, through the enactment of
Article 44A, the General Assembly effected "a waiver of sovereign
immunity, either express or implied." Id. at 619, 984 A.2d at 845
(quoting Jackson, 289 Md. at 120, 422 A.2d at 377). In Jackson, the
Court of Appeals of Maryland evaluated the specific provisions of
Article 44A and noted that these provisions both authorized and
mandated the purchase of liability insurance. Id. The court in Jackson
stated that the purchase of liability insurance triggered only a limited
waiver of the defense of governmental immunity, up to the amount of
coverage under the policy. Id. at 620, 984 A.2d at 845.
The court in Brooks specified that the "limited waiver" statement in
Jackson should be considered dictum because the language was not
necessary to the court's decision of whether Article 44A effected a
waiver. Brooks, 411 Md. at 621, 984 A.2d at 846. In addition, the
court clarified that, to the extent that the language from Jackson
referring to the limited waiver would not be considered dictum, it is
overruled. Id.
To determine the actual degree of the waiver, the court used
methods of statutory construction. Id. The court reviewed the statute
as a whole and compared it with similar statutes because the plain
language of Article 44A did not state whether the waiver of immunity
would be limited or complete. Id. at 622-26, 984 A.2d at 847-49.
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Specifically, the court compared Article 44A to other statutes that
waived liability and noted that, when the General Assembly intended
to limit such a waiver, it expressly stated the limitation within the
language of the Act. Id. at 624-25, 984 A.2d at 848. The court then
stated that the language of Article 44A did not cap the extent of the
HABC's liability for tortious acts. Id. at 623-24, 984 A.2d at 848.
Therefore, the court determined that, because the General Assembly
provided no clear indication in the statute to the contrary, Article 44A
effected a complete waiver. Brooks, 411 Md. at 625,984 A.2d at 848.
Accordingly, regarding Brooks' common law tort claim, the court
held that the lower court erred in granting the motion for summary
judgment in favor of the HABC. Id. at 626, 984 A.2d at 849. In
addition, the court addressed the second claim brought by Brooks
under the CPA. Id. at 627, 984 A.2d at 850. The court stated that,
because the HABC's only argument for immunity from suit under the
CPA was that the HABC had immunity to the same degree under the
CPA as it did under the common law, the lower court should not have
granted the motion for summary judgment with regard to the CPA
claim. Id.
In Brooks, the court's decision clarified that Article 44A
completely waives governmental immunity for tortious actions
committed by housing authorities. Thus, the court's ruling extends
protection to residents within the housing authorities' jurisdiction
beyond the limitations of the housing authorities' insurance coverage,
increasing the possible liability of the housing authorities. By
preventing the housing authorities from manufacturing immunity
through the purchase of minimal insurance policies, the court's
decision grants legal practitioners a better opportunity for recovery on
behalf of clients injured by a housing authority's tortious actions.

